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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
seem to require that damages, if awarded, be either purely nominal, or the
full amount of the legacy or devise. The possibility of awarding nominal
damages would answer those who decry awarding any damages at all, the
basis of their opinion being the impracticability of ascertaining what the
testator would have done but for the fraud.
With the increasing realization that the true function of the law is to
do justice, and the tendency to discard pat and arbitrary formulas, partic-
ularly in realizing that expectancies in many areas should be afforded the
protection of the law, it is to be expected that the right to a remedy at law,
in the problem herein discussed, will come to be firmly established. Its
dangers must not be overlooked; the fraud must clearly be shown to be
the ultimate cause of plaintiff's disappointment. To use the more familiar
language of torts, the fraud must be shown to be the proximate cause of
plaintiff's loss. But, when these conditions are met, the remedy in tort
should be invaluable when equity affords no protection.
COMPARATIVE INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE IN EQUITY
Equity's extraordinary jurisdiction in granting relief is well-known and
settled. However, within this vast, broad body of equitable principles
there exists a rather obscure doctrine which may, be termed "the doctrine
of comparative intelligence." This doctrine sters from the fact that it is
a principle of law and equity as well as of natural justice that a greater
degree of consideration and care is due persons who are unable to care for
themselves than to persons who are able. Interwoven with other discre-
tionary defenses, the doctrine has been used primarily to defeat actions for
the specific performance of contracts. Courts generally do not acknowl-
edge the existence of the "doctrine of comparative intelligence" by name;
nevertheless, from a study of cases, it is apparent that the principles un-
derlying the doctrine are being and have been applied in certain instances.
Before discussing "comparative intelligence," it is necessary to discuss
briefly some of the discretionary defenses to affirmative equitable relief.
In general, a court of equity will not interfere to relieve either party to
a contract, fairly entered into, from its binding effects because of the
wisdom or folly of the contract or because of bad business judgment; a
bargain is a bargain. 1
But, specific performance is not a right;2 it is granted in the discretion
of the court according to general rules and principles. 3 For instance, the
complainant must show the contract is not unjust or oppressive to the
defendant. 4 Specific relief may be denied on the ground that the defendant
1 Knott v. Cutler, 224 N.C. 427, 31 S.E. Ad 359 (1944).
2 Beard v. Morgan, 143 Neb. 503, io N.W. 2d 253 (1943).
3 London v. Doering, 325 Ill. 589, 156 N.E. 793 (1927).
4 Stone v. Pratt, 25 U1. 6 (x86o).
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did not intend to make the contract sued on or because of unilateral mis-
take or where a party has been overreached and has contracted under
circumstances of surprise, undue solicitation, sharp practice, trickery, or
any other unconscionable circumstances.5
To be specifically enforced, a contract must be for an adequate consid-
eration;6 however, adequacy of price does not mean equality of price.7
Equity will disregard a small difference in value,8 but if the consideration
is so grossly inadequate that it shocks the informed conscience of the
court and indicates unfairness or overreaching, specific performance will
be denied.9
Courts of conscience will not decree specific enforcement when the
contract is obtained by fraudulent representations of the complainant or
his agent.10 Generally, this is so regardless of whether the misrepresenta-
tions were in fact innocent or whether they were made with an actual
intent to deceive so long as they were material and relied on by the other
party to his detriment."
Closely related to fraud is concealment. Unless there is some exceptional
circumstance generating a duty to speak, it is the right of every man to
keep his business prospects to himself.12 But where a party by word or act
tends affirmatively to suppress material facts within his knowledge, which
facts are unknown to the other party, or to distract the attention of the
other party from such facts, the concealment warrants a denial of specific
relief. 18
Equitable relief will be withheld if, under the circumstances, the result
would be harsh, inequitable, oppressive, or would result in a hardship to
the defendant. 14 Hardship embraces a very broad category, and the hard-
ship sufficient to defeat an action for specific relief must be a grave one
which shocks the judicial conscience of the court. Mere fluctuations in
price and disappointment are not hardships if the contract was fair when
made. 15 The contract is judged as of the time it is entered into and the
fact that a hard bargain results because of subsequent circumstances and
changing events will not justify a withholding of relief.16
5 Eisenbeis v. Shillington, 349 Mo. io8, 159 S.W. zd 641 (i941).
6 Edwards v. Brown, 308 111. 350, 139 N.E. 618 (1923).
7 Schader v. White, 173 Cal. 441, r6o Pac. 557 (1916).
S Dunlop v. Wever, 209 Iowa 590, 2z8 N.W. 562 (1930).
9 Garsick v. Dehner, 145 Neb. 73, 15 N.W. zd z35 (1944).
'
0 Asher v. Asher, 278 Ky. 802, 1z9 S.W. 2d 552 ('939).
11 Note 5 supra.
12 Neil v. Shamberg, 158 Pa. 263, 27 Ad. 992 (1893).
13 Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 201 S.C. 427, 23 S.E. 2d 372 (1942).
14Todd v. Hyzer, 154 Fla. 702, 18 So. zd 888 (944).
15 Coral Gables v. Payne, 94 F. 2d 593 (C.A. 4 th, 1938).
'
6 Smith v. Farmers' State Bank of Alto Pass, 390 Ill. 374, 61 N.E. 2d 557 (1945).
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The "doctrine of comparative intelligence" is closely related to and inte-
grated with the foregoing defenses to specific performance. It exists with-
out a formal name and where it is applied, courts call it hardship or in-
adequacy or overreaching. When a court determines the fairness of a
contract by looking to the surrounding circumstances such as the incapac-
ity or inequality of the parties or their respective experience or inexperi-
ence in business matters, "comparative intelligence" is being called forth
from its shelf in the vast storeroom of equity jurisprudence.
In Falcke v. Gray,'7 a leading English case, the complainant and the
defendant contracted for the sale of two China jars, owned by the de-
fendant, at a price of forty pounds. Falcke, an eminent dealer in his trade
for over twenty-five years, knew the value of these objects of art to be
much more. Subsequently, the defendant sold the jars to a dealer and she
received two hundred pounds. Falcke then sought specific performance.
After deciding that specific performance would be decreed for a chattel
where the remedy at law was inadequate, the court felt it more equitable
to withhold relief under the circumstances. The parties were not on equal
footing as the plaintiff knew the true worth of the jars while the defendant
was ignorant of their value. It was pointed out that in this case mere in-
adequacy of consideration would not be enough to resist specific relief.
Friend v. Lavzb 8 was a case in which the plaintiff agreed to sell his
realty to Mrs. Lamb by means of a contract containing terms so oppressive
that the Pennsylvania court felt that if a man encumbered himself with
such an agreement it would be a rash, improvident, and extremely hazard-
ous undertaking. Only a sagacious and experienced operator in speculative
transactions would be justified in entering a bargain, such as the one herein
involved, in the ordinary judgment of men. However, for a woman, un-
less possessed with a special skill and with ample capital, such a contract
would be almost entirely destructive, improvident, and oppressive. In this
case, the defendant did not possess any of the essential qualifications to
conduct the enterprise to a successful conclusion. The court refused spe-
cific performance, although making it clear that the plaintiff still had an
action at law for damages.
In determining whether specific performance should be decreed, this
court thought it proper to consider the fact that defendant was a married
woman and inexperienced in business; it stated that specific performance
would be denied in the case of married women as well as other persons
who were less protected and, comparatively speaking, in a more helpless
condition.' 9
17 z9 L.J. Ch. 28 (1859).
18 152 Pa. 5-9, 25 Ad. 577 (893).
19 For other instances where the "doctrine of comparative intelligence" has been
invoked in favor of women with little business experience, see the following cases:
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Equity will not lend its aid to the sharp, experienced businessman who
deals unjustly with an uneducated and inexperienced person. Gaskins v.
Byrd2O held that contracts for the sale of real estate would not be specifi-
cally enforced where the particular facts and circumstances clearly showed
inequality of the contracting parties due to the inexperience and lack of
information of one party with respect to the subject-matter as compared
with the superior business qualities and information of the other party.
The plaintiff in Wolford v. Steele21 sued for specific enforcement of an
agreement for the sale to him of all the coal and other mineral rights un-
derlying the defendant's land. He was an educated, bright, wide-awake
real estate agent who was familiar with the value of property. In contrast,
the defendant was seventy-four years old, of infirm health, and without
any education whatever. He could neither read nor write and was an
ignorant man who was "unused to the ways of the world." The considera-
tion was less than the value of the land and the court held that it would
not specifically enforce a hard and unconscionable bargain where the
ability and knowledge of the contracting parties was so unequal as to
result in one being overreached and his property sacrificed by the in-
adequacy of the consideration. 22
Campbell Soup Company v. Wentz 8 saw the court refuse specific per-
formance of a contract whereby the defendant agreed to sell certain
types of carrots to the plaintiff. The court stated, "We think it (the con-
tract) is too hard a bargain and too one-sided an agreement to entitle the
plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience. '2 4 By implication, the court
here was using the "comparative intelligence" doctrine as it was protect-
ing the comparatively ignorant farmer from an agreement which unfairly
tied him up at the hands of a large corporation which, through its legal
staff and officers, were superior to him. 25
An early Illinois case, Fish v. Leser,26 involved a suit to order per-
Forman v. Gadouas, 247 Mass. 207, 142 N.E. 87 (1924); Shoop v. Burnside, 78 Kan.
871, 98 Pac. 202 (19o8); Banaghan v. Malaney, 2oo Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 (19o8); Burk-
halter v. Jones, 3 Kan. 5 (I884).
2066 Fla. 432, 63 So. 824 (1913).
21 27 Ky. L.R. 88,'84 S.W. 327 (1905).
22 Wollums v. Horsley, 93 Ky. 582, 20 S.W. 781 (1892). This case also involved the
sale of mineral rights by an aged, uneducated, and inexperienced farmer to an expe-
rienced business man for an inadequate price.
2 172 F. 2d 8o (CA. 3d, 1948).
24 Ibid., at 83.
25 Accord: Dunlop v. Wever, 2-o9 Iowa 590, 228 N.W. 562 (1930); Bartley v. Linda-
bury, 89 N.J. Eq. 8, 104 At. 333 (Ch., 1918). In the Bartley case, supra, there was a
bill for specific performance of a contract to sell stock in exchange for a farm,
against a farmer unfamiliar with business methods.
269 Il. 394 (1873).
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formance of a contract for the sale of real estate valued at $30,0o0 and
sold for $21,000. The home of the defendants was destroyed on the land
in question by the Chicago fire of 1871. Unknown to the defendants who
were "weak-minded and unacquainted with business," the property had
gone up in price because of the prospective construction of new buildings.
Defendants were still terror-stricken from the great fire when they
entered into the bargain with the plaintiff, a shrewd real estate dealer. The
court declined to decree specific performance against the defendants who
were comparatively less intelligent and experienced than the complainant.27
In Wrobel v. Wojtasiek,28 a bill was brought for the specific enforce-
ment of an agreement for the exchange of land. Defendant was an igno-
rant and illiterate man, unable to read and write English and unfamiliar
with business. The contract called for a trade of defendant's premises
worth $19,ooo for complainant's land, valued between $9,ooo and 5i 2,ooo.
The court said that where unfair advantage has been taken of the igno-
rance, the confidence, the friendship, or the inexperience of one of the
contracting parties, the contract, though it might not be rescinded, may
not be specifically performed.
Aside from its role in the field of specific performance, the "doctrine of
comparative intelligence" has also been applied in suits to rescind con-
tracts. In Hiltpold v. Stern,29 the court held that a purchaser, induced by
false representations to buy property may rescind and sue for the con-
sideration. Going further, the court stated that the inexperience and igno-
rance of one of the parties, when contrasted with the superior knowledge
of the other party, may make a misrepresenation as to value actionable
which would not be had the dealings been between more equally matched
parties.30
"Comparative intelligence" is actually a comparison whereby equity
will weigh the qualifications of both parties to an agreement against one
another. In this manner the courts attempt to balance the equities between
the parties. It must be remembered that in a commercial age, contracts are
procured by those who possess information by which they expect to
profit because they are better informed than those from whom the agree-
inents are desired. This is generally fair legally and morally.
There is an interesting dilemma in which courts find themselves. On
-7 Accord: Dunlop v. Wever, 2o9 Iowa 590, 228 N.W. 56z (1930); Wilson v.
Bergmann, iz Neb. 145, 198 N.W. 671 (1924).
*,8 341 Ill. 330, 173 N.E. 348 (1930). Accord: Miller v. Tiexhus, 20 S.D. 12, io4 N.W.
519 (1905)-
298z A. 2d 123 (Mun. C.A., D.C., 1951).
3u Accord: Sell v. Gup, 338 Pa. 134, 12 A. 2d i (194o); Gross v. Stone, 173 Md. 653,
197 At. 137 (1938). These two cases are similar in nature to the case under discus-
sion and a recission was allowed in both because of the comparatively inexperienced
and ignorant status of the parties aggrieved.
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one hand, courts are reluctant to disturb the binding force of contracts
purporting to express the will and purpose of the parties, by refusing spe-
cific enforcement or by granting recission. On the other hand, they are
unwilling to permit this salutory and beneficent policy to be used as a
shield to protect those who have obtained from the weak, the unwary,
the helpless, or the ignorant, an unconscionable and inequitable advantage.
To illustrate, in Johnston Realty and Investment Company v. Grosvenors
the Michigan court refused specific enforcement because the defendant's
simplicity, credulity, and lack of experience was seized upon by over-
zealous plaintiffs. However, a divided court resulted and the dissenting
opinion favored the proposition that as long as there was no fraud, a court
of equity should not aid one to escape a bad bargain.
Between these two opposite poles, there exists a sphere wherein equity
may apply the "doctrine of comparative intelligence." It is important to
remember that courts are reluctant and hesitate to invoke the doctrine for
fear that the door be let open wide and the sanctity of contracts under-
mined by easy escape from specific performance of such agreements. All
that may be said is that in a justiciable case, where the equities between
the parties warrant, a court of chancery may compare the differences
between the contracting parties and withhold the relief sought.
THE ALLUREMENT ELEMENT AND
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
The attractive nuisance doctrine is a controversial theory which imposes
liability upon the occupier of land for injuries sustained by trespassing
children as a result of dangerous conditions maintained by the occupier
on his premises. The doctrine is not a new one, having had its origin in
English common law in the case of Lynch v. Nurdin.1
A number of American jurisdictions, most of them in the eastern
industrial states, have refused to accept or apply the attractive nuisance
doctrine at all, leaving the.rights and liabilities of the parties for solution
in accordance with the ordinary principles of negligence.2 However, in
31 241 Mich. 321, 217 N.W. 20 (1928).
1 1 Q.B. 29, 55 Rev. Rep. 191, 113 English Reports 1o41 (1841).
2 Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110, 193 Ad. 6o8 (1937); State To Use Of Alston v.
Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Co., 176 Md. 341, 4 A. 2d 739 (1939); Falardeau v. Mal-
den and Melrose Gas Light Co., 275 Mass. x96, 175 N.E. 471 (193); Ryan v. Towar,
1z8 Mich. 463, 87 N.W. 644 (0Ol); Kaproli v. Central R. of New Jersey, 1o5 N.J. L.
225, 143 Ad. 343 (1928); Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corporation, 28o N.Y. 11o, 19 N.E.
2d 981 (1939); Merriam v. Bonded Oil Co., 76 Ohio App. 435, 65 N.E. 2d 74 (1945);
Trudo v. Lazarus, 1i6 Vt. 221, 73 A. 2d 3o6 (195o); Washabaugh v. Northern Va.
Const. Co., 187 Va. 767, 48 S.E. 2d 276 (1948); Tiller v. Baisden, 128 W. Va. 126, 35
S.E. 2d 728 (1945).
